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ABSTRACT
This article provides an overview of the regulatory environment of the 
Hungarian system of local self-government based on the methods of le-
gal dynamics and economic analyses in a historical perspective tracing 
events back to the aftermath of World War II. The starting point of the 
analysis is 1947, the launching of soviet type command economy in Hun-
gary. Next is a detailed study of the regulation and evolution of local self-
government since its beginnings in the early 1990s following the change 
of regime, with a brief international outlook on the post-soviet countries 
surrounding Hungary. In our economic analysis, emphasis is placed on the 
period following Hungary’s accession to the European Union, a period 
that held out considerable opportunities for Hungarian local self-govern-
ments, but ultimately evolved into bankruptcy. The article presents de-
tailed reasons for the atypical nature of Hungarian local self-government 
indebtedness and the factors underlying this unfavourable process. Fur-
ther on, the procedure of debt consolidation and the essential elements 
of the new regulatory environment created after 2011 are described. In 
a brief international comparison, debt portfolio developments are ana-
lysed through the examples of Slovenia, Poland, Slovakia and the Czech 
Republic as analogue Central European countries, in order to provide fur-
ther proof of the atypical financial management of Hungarian local self-
governments, i.e. non-compliance with the rules and the not always solid 
budgetary discipline. The focus of the research underlying this paper is 
the impact the Hungarian regulation of self-governments had on the fi-
nancial sustainability of local self-governments’ financial management. 
Lentner, C., Hegedűs, S. (2019). Local Self-Governments in Hungary: Recent Changes 
through Central European Lenses. 
Central European Public Administration Review, 17(2), pp. 51–72
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The study confirmed the initial hypothesis that the business manage-
ment rules set out with insufficient prudence, deficiencies in the control 
system, and excessive borrowing in foreign exchange led to bankruptcy 
of a number of local self-governments and consequently jeopardised the 
proper provision of public services.
Keywords: comparative analysis, local self-government, indebtedness, public 
finances,	Hungary,	Central	European	economies
JEL:	H70,	H71,	H72
1 Introduction
As local self-government systems provide the local dimension of performing 
public service tasks, they have a powerful impact on the living standards of the 
population, and consequently, the stable operation of local self-governments 
is of macro-economic interest. This paper gives an overview of the history of 
local self-government in Hungary from the socialist era to date, with special 
focus on the main events after the change of regime, in the context of other 
Central European countries that have undergone a similar development. The 
purpose of this paper is to highlight Hungary among the countries of similar 
history and similar modernisation efforts, and to direct the attention to a pe-
culiar local self-government financing practice.
In the period of command economy and during transition to a market econ-
omy, the Hungarian practice of local self-government adjusted to the opera-
tional principles of the Soviet Union, which had a profound impact on the re-
gion, and then after 1990, to those of the European Union. Similarly to other 
countries of the Central European region, after in Hungary transformation of 
the local self-government system after the change of regime was based on 
the European Charter of Local Self-Government, and these principles were 
also enforced during the 2011 reform. Since the change of regime, there have 
been two statutes in effect with both similarities and differences in regula-
tory content. Based on all these, the hectic changes in the financial situation 
of Hungarian local self-governments promise an exciting research topic this 
paper undertakes to present.
2 Literature review and methods
2.1 Literature review
The maintenance of operability for the public finances of the central govern-
ment and of local self-governments was in the limelight for political decision-
makers in the initial years that followed the 2007-2008 crisis.
According to the classical literature tenet, a fiscal crisis takes place when for 
certain reasons the state loses the opportunity of financing from the market, 
or when deficit financing runs into costs that paralise its fundamental opera-
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tion. This is characteristically caused by the unreliability of the government 
(Cordes et al. 2015). In the past decades this crisis has also become permanent 
in the case of local self-governments given substantial economic autonomy, 
as they have increasingly been raising the required funds from the banking, 
and more specifically from the bond market.
The government units, regions and local self-governments below the central 
level are characteristically less likely to go bankrupt than sovereign states, 
although local self-governments’ mass bankruptcy may trigger problems on 
a national level. The reasons for fiscal crises in local and regional units can be 
divided into two major groups: central and local factors.
The central factors include deregulation, insufficient transparency conditions, 
transfer of the fiscal crisis situation and an overall macro-economic crisis. Dur-
ing deregulation local self-governments are given the opportunity to finance 
their operative and investment activities from the financial markets. This is 
restricted by the application of fiscal rules and by the market’s disciplinary 
power. Kornai (2004) and Beck et al. (2016) think that if subnational institu-
tions cannot expect help from the central government, their budgetary limit 
remains hard, and this contributes to the disciplinary force of the market. 
However, it should be added that the inoperability of local self-governments 
jeopardise the security of the people living in the community and the supply 
of public services, and thus it is in the fundamental interest of both the cen-
tral and the local authorities to consolidate such a situation, and instead of 
enforcing the disciplinary power of the market, which may lead to the escala-
tion of social conflicts, to use the opportunity of rescue by the government.
The absence of transparency, which develops over a period of many years, 
may primarily arise from differences in the accounting rules and the possi-
bility or impossibility of their consolidation. Compliance with the budgetary 
regulations have accounting aspects that may gloss over any fiscal crisis situ-
ation (de Vicente Lama, 2017). This can be offset by a consistent application 
of accrual-basis accounting, by the consistent enforcement of supervisory 
powers, and by efficient business management, which may hardly leave any 
“skeletons” in the business system.
A vertical imbalance evolves when the expenses exceed the tax revenues of 
the central budget, while the local self-governments make surpluses from 
their local tax revenues. In this case the central budget reduces the imbalance 
by cutting back on support. This phenomenon took place, for instance in Hun-
gary as a result of the convergence trajectory adjustment package announced 
in the autumn of 2006, and in Italy in the early 1970s, when the central gov-
ernment reduced the share in tax revenues was reduced (Hagen et al. 2000) 
to the detriment of the local self-governments.
Local crisis factors include the following: a crisis situation in the structure of 
the local economy, effects of local politics, indebtedness by the local self-gov-
ernment’s institutions or their unsecured business management, and financ-
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ing their mostly unproductive investment projects from risky loans (foreign 
exchange loans, short-term credits).
The taxes collected by local self-governments heavily depend on the perfor-
mance of the local economy, and thus the industrial structures may cause 
high exposure in the local budget. As a characteristic cause, a given region’s 
economy may be insufficiently resilient to shocks, as it is typically specialised 
in one particular industry. A characteristic example includes Detroit, the city 
that built its economy on the automotive industry,and went bankrupt when 
the latter deteriorated (Jacoby, 2016).
The local political élite “inherently” endeavours to maximise the number of 
votes in order to get re-elected, and this may influence the level of indebted-
ness either by excessive current expenses or by the implementation of show-
case investments without internal resources. This may also be determined by 
the ideological background. De Vicente Lama (2017) established a statistical 
correlation between the party affiliations of local self-governments and the 
extent of their indebtedness.
If the business management of an organisation operating with the participa-
tion of a local self-government is insufficiently transparent, the owner can 
influence the debt portfolio of the local self-government or subnational or-
ganisation (Hagen et al. 2000). The relevant international research also apply 
to the atypical business management performed by Hungarian local self-gov-
ernments after the change of regime.
2.2 Material and methods
In this paper the financial regulation of Hungarian local self-governments and 
its evolution are analysed in an interdisciplinary approach. The numerical data 
used in this paper have been obtained from the databases of OECD and the 
National Bank of Hungary. The debt portfolio was studied using the time-line 
analysis in a breakdown by foreign exchange. The effect of exchange rated on 
debt was also taken into consideration on the basis of the official mean rate 
quoted by the National Bank of Hungary.
The other methodological approach applied in this study included a compari-
son of statutory regulations. The financial regulation applicable to Hungarian 
local self-governments, including financing and debt rules, has been analysed. 
In addition, analyses were also conducted in legal dynamics for this study, in 
order to evaluate changes in the statutory environment.
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3 The Hungarian local self-government system between 
1949 and 2011
3.1 The Hungarian local self-government system in the period of 
socialist planned economy
In 1947 Hungary was included among the countries of the socialist bloc, and 
its public administration and public law regime was adjusted to the soviet pat-
tern. Following the soviet model, local self-governments were called “coun-
cils”. In the period of the council system, the soviet-style constitution 1only 
recognized municipalities’ right to self-government to a limited extent, and 
local self-government autonomy was essentially eliminated. In the centralised 
state organisation, municipalities were considered as decentralised local units 
of the central government authority and exercised its power similarly to the 
soviet model. Thus the entry into force of Act I of 1950 practically eliminated 
local self-government. One of the preconditions of self-government is the 
independent income generation opportunity of municipalities, and this was 
terminated by the entry into force of Act I of 1950 (Gergely, 2005).
As to the structure of the municipal system, the first council act divided these 
units into county councils, district councils, city councils and village councils. 
Similarly to the National Assembly, the autonomy of county councils was ter-
minated, as they were practically brought under the control of the Hungarian 
Socialist Party, however, it exercised compliance supervision and had super-
visory functions over district, city and village councils. County councils had a 
role in the planning, implementation and coordination of local projects and 
public investments. However, they were unable to influence central plans, 
and could not adequately support economic and social developments as the 
system was heavily centralised on a national level. Pursuant to the act, the 
tasks and competences of district councils included the coordination of vil-
lages and cities. The system was hierarchically built just as in the Soviet Union.
The new council act that entered into force in 1971 identified local self-gov-
ernments as public administration organisations, stressing the representation 
of people, however, the latter was merely formal. The structure was char-
acterised by the termination of subordination between councils, and district 
councils were liquidated, so the formerly three-tier system became two-tier.
Local self-government was also limited financially at every level, as they did 
not have any income of their own. In another perspective, local self-govern-
ments were not authorised to perform asset management, as councils were 
only entitled to act as trustees.
1 See: Act XX of 1949 on the Constitution of the People’s Republic of Hungary, Articles 29-35 on 
the local organisations of the government authority.
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3.2 The Hungarian local self-government system after the 
change of regime
After the regime change, the legislators endeavoured to establish a modern, 
operable and autonomous system of local self-governments. To this end, the 
principles laid down in the European Charter of Local Self-Government (here-
inafter: Charter) were taken into account. The Charter professes and recog-
nises the principles of fiscal decentralisation and gives guidance to the coun-
tries in them. 2 The central element regulating transposition was Act LXV of 
1990, which regulated local self-government operation. The most important 
criterion of the statute containing a total of 118 articles is that it regulates the 
legal and economic foundations of local self-governments, namely the right 
to self-government. Its provisions were repealed gradually between 1st Janu-
ary 2012 and 2nd October 2014.
The first act on local self-governments and the sectoral laws established the 
mandatory duties and competence of local self-governments. After articulat-
ing local self-governments’ mandatory tasks and powers, the National Assem-
bly ensured the financial conditions required for their performance, decided 
on the amount and disbursement method of budgetary support and included 
all these in Chapter IX of the budget act at any time.
In addition to the Charter, in line with the spirit of the times, the principles 
of the New Public Management were also taken into consideration, as mani-
fest in the freedom of organisation and service solicitation. This opportunity 
frequently resulted in the outsourcing of mandatory tasks previously falling 
within the competence of local self-governments to companies operating on 
a market basis (e.g. holding and operation of municipal assets and the provi-
sion of public utility services). All this meant that local self-governments were 
given carte blanche in the elaboration of their service organisation solutions, 
as they were only responsible for the organisation and not the actual perfor-
mance of the duties. Law granted municipalities the right to independently 
develop their organisational structure and operational procedures, to freely 
dispose of the local self-government’s assets, to manage their income inde-
pendently, and to provide for the performance of voluntarily undertaken and 
mandatory municipal tasks. The regulation also allowed them to undertake 
business activities.3 This created additional opportunity for the local self-gov-
ernment system to freely associate with other local self-governments, to form 
with regional and national interest representation organisations to represent 
and protect their interests, to cooperate with foreign local self-governments 
within the scope of their tasks and competences, and to join international as-
sociations of local self-governments.
2 Fiscal decentralisation depends on numerous variables. One of the empirical research ap-
proach to this matter was examined by Benčina, J. and Mrdža Kovačič, A. (2013). The statisti-
cal correlations between the quality of governance and decentralisation was studied by Umek 
(2014).
3 In practice, instead of this organisational form, they were implemented as business associa-
tions, primarily due to the difficulty of accounting reconciliation.
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The first act on local self-governments ensured independence in earning and 
using incomes, and also regulated the incomes of local self-governments. 
They covered the costs of performing their mandatory and voluntary tasks 
from their own incomes, assigned central taxes, granted revenues, central 
budgetary contributions and aids. Their own incomes included local taxes4, 
revenues for capital formation and liquid assets received.
The specific part of the income tax collected by the central tax authority 
from the public administration section of the local self-governments could be 
termed assigned central tax, however, the part returned to local self-govern-
ments gradually decreased. Personal income tax, which was first imposed in 
1988, was still completely a council income, but later on, after the change of 
regime 80, and then 50 per cent of it was transferred to the central budget. 
By 2013 the ratio returned to local self-governments in the second tax year 
preceding the budget year had already dropped to a mere 8 per cent, and fur-
ther 32 per cent was allocated to local self-governments depending on their 
level of development.5 Of all property taxes, only vehicle tax was paid to the 
central budget but 100 per cent of it was collected by the local organisations.
The contributions financed by the central budget included conditional and 
statutory subsidies. The role of the latter in local self-government financing 
further increased over the years. In addition, in the budget act the National 
Assembly laid down priority social objectives. The funds allocated for them 
were called “priority appropriations” and the local self-governments had a 
share in them in different forms year after year. In order to facilitate commu-
nity convergence projects, a system of allocations and targeted financial sup-
port was set up. To avoid operational difficulties, the local self-governments 
that were disadvantaged for reasons beyond their control could request sup-
plementary aid at tenders, and later on this was completed by support to in-
operable local self-governments from the special budget of the Ministry of 
the Interior, up to 2011.
Concerning their financial management, local self-governments were allowed 
to take loans, with the condition that neither the core assets, nor the statuto-
ry state contribution, any other state aid, personal income tax and the funds 
received from the central budget for operation could not be used as collat-
eral. Liquid loans, e.g. current account overdrafts, used for overcoming tem-
porary liquidity shortages, were an exception to this. As a regulatory element, 
the debt service cap was 70 per cent of the annual appropriation for their 
own current income less the short-term liabilities (principal repayment and 
interest payment, lease fee) for the given year, in other words, the adjusted 
current revenues of their own [Article 88 (2) of the Act on Local self-govern-
ments]. The local self-governments were required to report the relevant data, 
but no effective penalty followed overspending, thus there was no supervi-
sory organization that would have punished its violation. Only the State Audit 
Office was authorized to act, but typically, they did not take any action.
4 Based on Act C of 1990 on Local Taxes, still in effect.
5 The system of divided taxes also works in Slovenia: corporate income taxes are shared by the 
central and the local level, see Klun and Stambuk (2015) and Klun (2012).
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Important amendments after 1996 included codification of the debt manage-
ment procedure (Act XXV of 1996 on the management of local self-government 
debts), and the specification of responsibilities, which provided that the mu-
nicipal council must guarantee the safety of management and made the mayor 
accountable for compliance. As the purpose of the procedure was to restore 
the solvency of communities, it was a kind of a bankruptcy proceeding which 
was not allowed to result in the termination of the local self-government. The 
number of procedures barely exceeded a hundred between 1990 and 2010.
In addition to the creation of revenues and economic self-reliance, another 
means of restoring local self-governments’ independence was the transfer of 
assets. Act XXXIII of 1991 assigned the assets previously owned by the state, 
including residential and non-residential property, listed historical buildings, 
protected natural areas, lands, public utilities, waters, public purpose water fa-
cilities, water utilities and other assets, into local self-government ownership.6
Thus the financial fundamentals provided the background for the creation of 
a public service organisation. The first act on local self-governments devolved 
the operation of the human infrastructure, with focus on public education 
and healthcare, to the competence of local self-governments among manda-
tory duties. The Hungarian system of local self-governments has been charac-
terised by the fact that in addition to the said act, other statutes may also del-
egate tasks to and set quality requirements for local self-governments. This 
was called “task decentralisation” and at a later phase it led to problems as the 
delegation of tasks by the central organisations were not followed by the al-
location of funds, neither in nominal nor in real terms, thus the budget deficit 
was shifted from the central government to the local and municipal system, 
and this is how the phenomenon of decentralised budget deficit evolved.
During elaboration of the system of tasks, numerous questions were left 
unanswered, e.g. the intermediate level regional governments remained 
weightless, and the public duties were not differentiated according to com-
munity size. The establishment of development regions, each comprising sev-
eral county governments, was a preponderant event in the Hungary of the 
2000s, but in the past decade they disappeared without trace.
Concerning its characteristic features, the Hungarian local self-government 
system simultaneously had the hallmarks of the Northern European and 
Southern European self-government models, as it imposed substantial duties 
on a fragmented system of local self-governments. Although encountering 
an increasing number of problems, this system proved to be sustainable up to 
Hungary’s accession to the European Union, however, the period of abundant 
funds after the accession, or more specifically, the shortage or absence of 
funds required to pay their contribution as a precondition to drawing down 
EU funds brought them, somewhat paradoxically, to the brink of inoperability.
6 Act XXXIII of 1991 on the transfer of ownership of certain state-owned assets to local self-
governments 
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4 The Hungarian local self-government system after 
hungary’s accession to the European Union
4.1 The impact of accession to the European Union on the 
financial management of local self-governments
After 2004, due to Hungary’s accession to the European Union, the quality 
requirements set for the public duties of local self-governments tightened in 
order to improve the standard of public services used by the population and 
adjust them to that of the European Union. To this end, the quality param-
eters of human public services were stepped up, and the sectoral ministries 
required municipalities to implement increasingly large-scale plans. However, 
the problem was triggered by the fact that the budget acts ensured very lit-
tle, if at all, of the funds required for the implementation of the more costly 
duties. This resulted in the rapid accumulation of an operating deficit the lo-
cal self-governments found difficult to absorb.
The Convergence Plan, adopted in 2006 for the reorganisation of public fi-
nances that were out of balance, had a powerful impact on local self-govern-
ments’ financial management, as it gave a greater role to municipalities in the 
provision of public services, merely to save money for the central budget.7 
The reason for this was that prior to Hungary’s accession to the European 
Union, the financial positions of the local self-government system had been 
relatively more favourable (than those of the central budget), however, there 
was an imbalance between the various local self-governments, as the positive 
balances were made primarily in bigger, well-industrialised cities, mainly those 
with county rights, while minor communities with hardly any revenues of their 
own and county governments made a loss. Thus, local self-governments’ fi-
nancial strength was erratic, but the duties were assigned indiscriminately, 
disregarding this fact. Local self-governments increasingly frequently used 
development funds and project loans to finance their operating expenses. As 
a result of the implemented task decentralisation and the failure to centralise 
funds, the decentralised government deficit and debt continued to increase, 
in other words, the potential deficit of the central budget was shifted to the 
orbit of local self-governments.
As a positive factor, with accession to the European Union access to develop-
ment funds opened up. The resources available in the Cohesion and Struc-
tural Funds offered the prospect of considerable development potentials 
for municipalities. From the year 2004, local self-governments were granted 
significant amounts of development aids from the European Union and from 
domestic sources to provide the infrastructure background required for at-
tendance to their responsibilities. With access to European aids, the regime 
of support to domestic development projects changed. In the first complete 
programming period, which began in 2007, the absorption of development 
7 After 2002, Hungary’s central budget underwent a drastic indebtedness process. By 2010, 
the government debt to GDP increased from 55 to 85 per cent. The budget deficit increment 
became permanent, and in 2006, prior to the adoption of the Convergence Plan, it exceeded 
10 per cent. For further details see: Lentner, 2018. 
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funds in an amount up to several orders of magnitude higher than the tar-
geted subsidies financed from the Hungarian budget for capital formation in 
the previous 17 years.
However, the operational programmes of the 2007-2013 programming pe-
riod frequently supported development projects that generated little or no 
additional revenue, and moreover, in many cases they triggered a sharp rise 
in operating expenses local self-governments often could not afford. Nev-
ertheless, the main problem is that the local self-governments do not have 
sufficient resources for making the contribution required for access to the 
EU aids in order to support the implementation of their development tasks. 
As the EU funds encouraged important municipal investment projects, the 
local self-governments obtained the funds for the contribution required for 
access to them through loans and bond issuance, which led to the indebted-
ness of the local self-government system. For the most part, they used the EU 
aids and the loans they had taken for infrastructure improvement and other 
non-productive projects, thus no production or other coverage in real terms 
was created to subsequently finance debt service. In addition, local self-gov-
ernments did not have any income in foreign currency to repay the loans, and 
thus they were grossly exposed to the foreign exchange rate and later on 
caused exchange rate losses.
4.2 The impact of the economic crisis on Hungarian local  
self-governments – heading towards bankruptcy
The 2007-2008 economic crisis and the increasing instability of the local self-
government system had a major impact on the complete system of public 
finances.8 Hungarian local self-governments’ indebtedness accelerated after 
2006, mainly due to the issue of foreign currency bonds, with the account 
managing banks typically acting as subscribers to the municipal bonds. This 
instrument was popular because it was not subject to any public procurement 
and the issuer local self-government could set the conditions in agreement 
with the account managing banks. As bond use was not limited by any target, 
and the requirements were very slight under weak state or EU control, most 
of the funds collected were used to repay previous debts or to finance opera-
tion, but a considerable part of the funds were not used at all, as they were 
time deposits for a specific purpose. Obviously, the predominant part of the 
revenues earned on the issuance of foreign exchange bonds, especially EU 
aids, was used for the specified purposes, however, these projects were fre-
quently exaggerated and, more importantly, non-productive. With the escala-
tion of the international financial crisis, the foreign exchange bonds issued 
for the implementation of non-productive projects imposed a significant debt 
service on local self-governments, which did not have any income in foreign 
currency, and thus in order to be able to repay they purchased foreign ex-
8 The 2011-2012 central budget balance, which was “working out all right”, was deteriorated 
and the general government deficit was pushed above 3 per cent by the unfavourable devel-
opments in local self-government finances. Subsequently, however, the State Audit Office’s 
audits regularly revealed the deficiencies in local self-government management, and various 
government decisions were taken as a result. 
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change and consequently suffered grave losses, considerably deteriorating 
their liquidity, as despite its economic independence ensured since the 1990s, 
the Hungarian system of local self-governments had continuously struggled 
with liquidity problems. These problems were compounded by the fact that 
the local self-governments did not have sufficient operating income to contin-
ue the operation of most of the non-productive projects implemented from 
EU aids and foreign exchange denominated contribution (typically swimming 
pools, leisure centres and the renovation of public buildings).9 These items 
made the indebtedness of Hungarian local self-governments atypical.
In 2011 the audits performed by the State Audit Office revealed that the sub-
system of local self-governments was financially unstable, and the collapse 
of self-governments may considerably the local provision of public services, 
and moreover, may even seriously undermine the complete system of public 
finances. As the local self-governments had no funds to repay the loans they 
had previously taken and to settle their bond-related debts, in 2011 the State 
Audit Office performed most of its audits in the system of local self-govern-
ments, as the latter had a grave impact on the complete regime of national 
public finances. Based on the State Audit Office’s investigations it turned out 
that local self-governments’ liquidity had considerably deteriorated between 
2007 and 2010 because the system suffered a shortage of funds simultane-
ously for capital formation and for operation. The local self-governments’ 
payment liabilities to banks increased and the liquidity loan agreements had 
to be regularly renewed with increasing credit lines. One of the reasons why 
this increasing debt portfolio grew into an enormous problem was that local 
self-governments failed to accumulate the reserves required for repayment, 
and they assumed a risk by offering local self-government core assets as cov-
erage for loans. The State Audit Office shed light on the fact that in the case 
of the issued bonds, the potential unfavourable development in exchange 
rates was not the only problem, as their early redemption or conversion to 
Hungarian forints may lead to unexpected costs.
The local self-governments’ exposure was further increased by rising ac-
counts receivable outstanding and the growing financing gap, in other words, 
the absence of funds to finance the projects after their implementation using 
EU funds and to cover their operating costs. Due to the capital investments 
in progress, in late 2010, local self-governments’ debt portfolio amounted to 
HUF 1154 billion (4.3 per cent of GDP produced in 2010), and external capital 
had to be raised in the amount of HUF 217 billion (0.8 per cent of GDP). Nev-
ertheless, the projects had to be completed, as the local self-governments’ in-
frastructure background was obsolete, and these projects increased the GDP 
output of the country, which was in crisis, and could ensure some employment. 
As an additional problem, the businesses in local self-government ownership 
also had a huge amount of debt, and thus the quality of the services they pro-
vided also “changeable”, but in the absence of a statutory authorisation, the 
State Audit Office was not allowed to verify it before 2011, and consequently, 
no central action could be taken to return their business management to nor-
9 For details of the evaluation of local self-government project, see Vasvári (2013).
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mal. After 2011, the consolidation procedure was implemented on the basis 
of the State Audit Office’s fact-finding investigation and recommendations 
targeted at putting local self-governments back on the right track. The State 
Audit Office’s role increased both in the renewal of state management and in 
legislation (Domokos et al, 2016), which became a system-specific element in 
the Hungarian model of public finances, as it made the State Audit Office an 
active (supply) participant in good governance.
In the previous decades, the cause of the difficulty was the unsuitability of the 
regulatory and control environment for preventing and effectively keeping 
local self-governments’ external fund raising under control. Although there 
was a limit set to debt in the system, it could not fulfil its purpose, as there 
had not been any authority to punish violation of the rules. Previously, the 
State Audit Office reported infringements, but it did not have the power to 
open a penal proceeding. As a result, the pressure of an increasing shortage 
of funds required for operation and capital formation and a spike in the for-
eign exchange rate brought the system on the verge of inoperability. This 
unfavourable process was ended by the action taken by the Hungarian pub-
lic finance system and its institutions (including the State Audit Office), with 
statutory support and methodological confirmation. The macro-economic 
developments were also favourable: the government debt dropped by 30 per 
cent relative to GDP, the budget deficit has been below 3 per cent since 2013, 
the inflation rate is very slight and can be moderated, and all these are ac-
companied by the continuous increase in the gross domestic product (GDP).10
5 The second act on local self-governments and the new 
regulatory environment
The second act on local self-governments came into force in 2011 in several 
stages. During the elaboration of the legislation, efforts were made at the 
increased enforcement of the Charter and at preventing the curbing of the 
independence of local self-governments. The complete financing regime and 
the responsibilities were re-regulated.
The second Act on Local self-governments chopped tasks to reasonable sizes, 
and gradually re-centralised human public services (education and health-
care), leaving only a very slight amount of mandatory duties to be performed 
by local self-governments. Local self-governments’ emphatic responsibilities 
include community operation and regional economy development, and the 
financing regime was adjusted accordingly. As less and minor duties were 
required of them, the role of central taxes given up in favour of local self-
governments changed, and state aids were granted in the form of financing 
specific tasks, but this actually falls within the scope of statutory financing. 
Personal income tax was removed from among shared central taxes, in other 
words, its total amount is collected centrally, and the local self-governments’ 
10 2019. In Q1 it increased by 5.3 per cent, the highest rate in Europe. In the previous period, 
which followed 2013, the gross domestic product increased by 3 to 5 per cent; and between 
2010 and 2019, additional 750 000 people have been involved in employment in a Hungary of 
10 million, reducing the unemployment rate from 12.3 to 3.6 per cent in a decade.
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share in vehicle taxes was reduced to 40 per cent. In relation to local taxes, 
local self-governments’ right to levy taxes was increased in addition to main-
taining the previous framework regulation. The local self-governments were 
authorized to impose communal taxes on any object not yet locally or cen-
trally levied.11 The responsibilities and competences of county governments 
were further reduced, which suggests continued reshaping in the Hungarian 
system of local self-governments.
According to Act XV of 1997, promulgating the European Charter of Local 
Self-Government, where public duties cannot be fulfilled in the given com-
munity, they must be performed by the public administrative organisation 
located closest to the citizens, the population. The second Act on Local self-
governments allowed the establishment of shared local self-government of-
fices, and after 2013, the communities with a headcount of 2000 or less and 
located in the same district were mandatorily required to set up joint mu-
nicipal offices. The main purposes of establishing joint local self-government 
offices are the improvement of public duties and public services and to cut 
costs. On 1 January 2012, public county institutions and the healthcare in-
stitutions maintained by the Local self-government of Budapest were trans-
ferred to central maintenance, and on 1 May in the same year, the hospitals 
maintained by local self-governments were also taken over by the state. How-
ever, the reasonable streamlining and centralisation of local self-government 
responsibilities were not the only features that characterised the period that 
followed 2010, as the local self-governments’ debts, which had turned to be 
unmanageable, also needed consolidation and centralisation.
5.1 Debt consolidation
After the entry into force of the new self-government rules, the economic 
policy regime made efforts at creating a stable environment for local self-
governments. As the various local self-government segments encountered 
different problems, differentiated solutions were elaborated for them in reg-
ular consultation with the local self-governments. The reason for this is that 
similarly to the other countries of the European Union; in Hungary small-size 
communities have reduced financial capacities (de Vries-Sobis, 2019).
In the first round of consolidation, the total debts owed by county govern-
ments were consolidated. This is explained by the fact that in the absence of 
incomes of their own, they barely had appropriate coverage for repayment, 
and therefore county government debts and institutions were completely 
taken over by the state in 2012. This was followed by the transfer of debts 
owed by communities with headcounts above and below 5000 in two staged, 
in 2013 and 2014, respectively, and thus the total amount of debts outstand-
ing on 31 December 2013 were assumed (Lentner, 2014). Financial consoli-
dation is an unusual method in managing local self-government debt (which 
may well be termed the last resort), but it did also happen in Italy and Ger-
11 This considerably increased municipal independence in taxation, and taxes can be used for 
targeted taxes, social purposes or community development.
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many. The total consolidated amount was EUR 4.54 billion, representing 4.45 
percent of GDP based on the 2014 data.
Table 1: The debt consolidation procedure
Types of local self-government Year
Affected local self-
governments
Consolidated 
amount, EUR 
billion
County governments 2012 20 0.69 
Communities with a headcount 
below 5000
2013 1730 0.28
Communities with a headcount 
exceeding 5000
2013 279 2.05
Consolidation of the remaining 
portfolio
2014 511 1.52
Total - 2078 4.54
Source: The authors’ compilation based on the specific data reported by the 
Hungarian State Treasury
Note: The data provided in Table 1 are calculated at the mean foreign ex-
change rate quoted by the National Bank of Hungary (at the end of the given 
year).
In order to prevent local self-governments from accumulating significant 
amounts of debt, numerous limiting factors and rules were introduced with 
the rules-based budget practice.
5.2 Means to prevent repeated indebtedness
In order to improve municipal management, which had been insufficiently 
regulated and controlled for decades, and to prevent the repeated evolution 
of the debt consolidation pressure, several limitations were imposed on local 
self-governments’ financial independence, including their rights to establish 
companies and obtain participation in business organisations.12 Municipal 
self-governments may only participate in business organisations if the as-
sets they contribute exceed their accountability (such include limited liability 
companies and company limited by shares). The fulfilment of their voluntarily 
undertaken duties and business activities may not prevent local self-govern-
ments from the performance of their mandatory duties.
12 Thus by placing independence in a reasonable frame, the new regulation intends to operate 
an economic policy and regulatory environment that can nip undisciplined, debt-generating 
management in the bud. Thus we hope to avoid the application of the pressure to consolidate 
debts. As described above, the consolidation pressure or the rescue, is already the outcome of 
a process. But in order to avoid using the central budget for a (repeated) rescue of organisa-
tions, poor management should be prevented by consistent regulation (for more details see: 
Lentner, 2015).
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Act on economic stability.13 As from 1 January 2012, the transactions that 
increase local self-government debts were limited at numerous points. Local 
self-governments are only allowed to take liquid loans for the purposes of 
ensuring their operation, i.e. they can only finance their deficit on operation 
from internal resources, and may not use external ones. Based on the statu-
tory requirements that came into force in 2013, local self-governments are 
no longer allowed to schedule operating deficit at all. In addition, the Stability 
Act also stipulated that the payment liabilities due in the reporting year and 
arising from debt-generating municipal transactions may not exceed 50 per 
cent of their own revenues realised in the reporting year in any year up to the 
end of the term. This rule was intended to prevent local self-governments’ 
running into insolvency. In addition, it was required that local self-govern-
ments may only perform debt-generating development and operation-re-
lated activities with the government’s preliminary consent. Some of the loan 
transactions are, however, not subject to authorisation. These include loans 
to finance the contribution required for access to European Union develop-
ment aids, and operating loans maturing within one year, as for the most part 
they leave the government debt measured against the Maastricht criteria 
unaffected. Furthermore, the transactions generating a debt below HUF 10 
million, or in the case of Budapest and the cities with county rights, HUF 100 
million, and the reorganisation loans used for the conclusion of agreements 
with creditors during debt consolidation.
After the settlement of responsibilities, the expenditures of Hungarian local 
self-governments dropped from 20 to 11-12 per cent within the total expens-
es of the general state budget (Sivák, 2005). Repeated municipal indebted-
ness is also prevented by a strict system of control, which includes regular 
central reviews, an internal audit system, 14and regular audits by the State 
Audit Office. After debt consolidation, local self-governments were required, 
with high priority, to prevent the increase of their debts, and to create their 
own operating balance to ensure the fulfilment of public duties. Although the 
foreign exchange loans taken by local self-governments have been assumed, 
the high debt owed by businesses in local self-government ownership con-
tinue to pose a risk for the municipal sector of public finances and indirectly, 
the complete general government. For this reason, the application of modern 
controlling instruments has an important role in ensuring stability (Zéman, 
2017).
13 Act CXCIV of 2011
14  The audits of local self-governments’ internal control systems, performed by the State Audit 
Office, are described in a 2014 study by Benedek et al. 
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Figure 1: Distribution of Hungarian local self-government debts
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After the debt consolidation, debts had slightly increased by 2018 according 
to the statistics of the National Bank of Hungary, mainly in the accounts receiv-
able. However, the viability of the regulation is confirmed by the termination 
of financing via foreign exchange bonds, and thus the exposure to exchange 
rates no longer complicates management. Between 2017 and 2018, the ratio 
of long-term loans increased by approx. 75 per cent (to EUR 550 million), but 
this hardly represents 10 per cent of liabilities, considerably below the 2013 
peak (preceding consolidation).
In contrast to the previous indebtedness, a significant ratio of the new loans 
finances projects that will generate additional tax revenues. Local self-gov-
ernments frequently assume financing for terrain correction required for the 
resettlement of automotive factories, and later on these will provide cov-
erage for repayment (from taxes levied and collected by the local self-gov-
ernment). The majority of other liabilities are accounts receivable, operative 
items related to capital investments, covered by current revenues, and thus 
not causing any liquidity problem.
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Figure 2: The official price of EUR and CHF to HUF
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One of the specific features of indebtedness by Hungarian local self-govern-
ments is that they issued bonds in foreign exchange, and thus they undertook 
long-term liabilities. As illustrated in Figure 2, this was a risky decision for lo-
cal self-governments, as after the 2006-2008 wave of bond issues, the HUF 
exchange rate gradually weakened, and so they suffered a considerable ex-
change rate loss, representing an increase in the debt portfolio in the national 
currency (HUF). Changes in the exchange rates and their debt generating ef-
fects allow the conclusion that the consolidation of local self-governments’ 
debt was justified, as the HUF rate to both CHF and EUR continued to weak-
en considerably during and after the consolidation. Local self-governments 
would have been incapable of absorbing these burdens as they did not have 
any incomes in foreign exchange, and the overwhelming majority of the capi-
tal investments implemented from bond revenues was unproductive, in other 
words, they did not have the capacity to generate yields.
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Figure 3: Distribution of Hungarian local self-government debts in  
foreign exchange
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Figure 3 clearly confirms that the instruments denominated in foreign ex-
change had a major role in the indebtedness of Hungarian local self-govern-
ments. The FX bond portfolio peaked in 2010 (recognised in HUF), while the 
FX loan portfolio reached its maximum in 2011. Presuming an unchanged 
portfolio, the exchange rate losses resulting from changes in the issue price 
had an impact of 12 per cent on the bond portfolio and of 8 per cent on loans, 
according to the authors’ calculations.
6 Hungarian local self-governments’ indebtedness in an 
international comparison
The grave indebtedness of Hungarian local self-governments and the cen-
tral consolidation of their debts is an atypical phenomenon of the Central 
and Eastern European Region. No similar situation evolved in the surround-
ing countries. It should be emphasised that the countries participating in the 
Visegrád cooperation (V4) and Slovenia have similar histories, geographical 
sizes and development levels, and that Slovenia and Slovakia are members in 
the monetary union, thus they are protected against exchange rate fluctua-
tions, and as an essential element, all the five countries reorganised their local 
self-governments in the spirit of the European Charter of Local Self-Govern-
ment, but in Hungary, control was rather lenient in the two decades following 
the change of regime (Lentner et al. 2018).
Central European Public Administration Review, Vol. 17, No. 2/2019 69
Local Self-Governments in Hungary: Recent Changes through Central European Lenses
Figure 4: Distribution of long-term debts in a few countries of  
the post-soviet region
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Figure 2 gives a comparison of local self-government debts to GDP in the 
Visegrád countries and Slovenia. Ever country is characterised by similar budg-
etary regulations applicable to local self-government operation in the period 
reviewed (Kotia and Lledó, 2016). The figure clearly shows that only Hungary 
is characterised by a sharp increase after the accession to the EU, while in 
the other countries the debt portfolio primarily increased in the period after 
the economic crisis. In the case of Slovenia, debts have been increasing since 
2006, but were mitigated in the past few years.15 Debt to GDP started to fall 
in Hungary in the years of the crisis, from 2011. Next in the line was Slovakia, 
and then from 2014 local self-government debts began to decrease in the 
two other countries studied. Despite the fact that a new programming period 
of the EU started in 2014, this development continued till the end of the pe-
riod. Hungary is the only exception, but this is due the fact that it started from 
a very low baseline after the debt consolidation, and to the perceptible and, 
more importantly, to a rise in short-term liabilities (cf. Figure 1 and Figure 2).
As a result of the global economic crisis, local self-government debt increased 
in every country of the world but the pace of growth in Hungary was unparal-
leled. Based on the trends the conclusion can be drawn that both local self-
governments and the economic policy management were in favour of a sta-
ble and predictable debt portfolio, which is characteristic in every reviewed 
country in the post-soviet region after the crisis. As in the case of solvency the 
high-standard provision of public services is more likely, chances are better 
15 About the implementation of duties by the Hungarian and Slovenian local self-governments, 
see Nagy et al. 2019.
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for compliance with the Charter if the economic fundamentals are stable and 
regulated.
7 Conclusions
Following Hungary’s accession to the EU, its local self-governments encoun-
tered irreversible financial difficulties for a number of reasons. On the one 
hand, the sectoral policies raised the quality requirements of public services, 
and on the other, the restriction on central budget financing set out in the 
Convergence Plan adversely affected local self-governments. Following the 
evolution of an exchange rate boom during the crisis, the foreign exchange 
loans taken and the foreign exchange bonds issued for the contribution to 
the development funds that became accessible after accession to the Euro-
pean Union greatly increased the Hungarian local self-governments’ burdens, 
however, they still needed the projects, as they had underdeveloped infra-
structure.
The situation that had evolved by 2010 showed that the municipalities were 
incapable of paying their debt service, and so the economic policy leadership 
saw the re-regulation of responsibilities justified. This was accomplished by 
the renewal of the complete statutory regulation applicable to the field and 
by debt consolidation to solve atypical indebtedness; and simultaneously, 
a considerable part of the public duties assigned to local self-governments 
were decentralised. These factors were necessary for the safe operation of 
the economic fundamental that are indispensable for the provision of public 
services. After 2011 the political will gave green light to the required reforms, 
which were accomplished by changing the complex legislative environment.
Financial regulation tightened and the previous lenient regulation was re-
placed by more stringent calls to account and control, as is manifest in the 
legislative background and in the increasing control authorisations. The con-
trol functions of the State Audit Office and the government offices were 
enhanced: the former was authorised to check fulfilment of the economic 
requirements, while the latter verified compliance with the statutory regu-
lations. In addition, the Hungarian State Treasury’s supervisory powers have 
also increased: it is now authorised to impose sanctions. In the new system 
of public finance controls, the State Audit Office was assigned a particularly 
important role due to its prohibitive and guiding regulation and its proactive 
participation in legislation with the right to make proposals.
In the Visegrád countries and Slovenia, which have a past similar to Hungary, 
local self-government debt also decreased after the crisis, and this confirms 
the strengthening of predictable public finance regulation in the Central Eu-
ropean region. In this process, Hungary was the first to make efforts at reduc-
ing municipal debts, however, after recovery from the crisis, every studied 
country followed a similar course, and this may contribute to the improve-
ment of public services used in local communities, and thus serves the most 
effective possible enforcement of the European identity and of the Charter.
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